In this article, we investigate the political theology of populism and look at the case of the Front National. Considering the writings of Carl Schmitt and Ernesto Laclau, we trace the logical core of Schmitt’s political theology and show how it is integrated into theories of the political and Laclau’s theory of populism. We argue that the theologico-political core of populism is the simultaneous disavowal and imposition of mediation and that this stance leads to an increasing formalism. Looking at the (...) discourse of the FN on the notion of laïcité, we find that this theologico-political structure explains how the party is able to link traditionally left- and right-wing motives in its discourse. Finally, we show how in FN’s discourse, the formalist tendency of populism, which Laclau has theoretically explicated, has become overt and must be understood as part of politics, not as a universal and tran-historical logic of the political. This suggests, we argue pace Laclau, that we ought to consider both t... (shrink)

This article concerns the nature of reason in the work of the Twentieth Century Catholic theologian Erich Przywara and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. The discussion centers on three interlocking issues: the question whether proper thinking submits to or transgresses the principle of non-contradiction; the relationship between reason and history; the theological concern with distinguishing the “history of reason” and the divine life. It is argued that both Hegel and Przywara give an account of reason where there are moments of contradiction, (...) and that this is a necessary feature of historical existence. Further, while Przywara and others are concerned with Hegel’s making reason’s reconciliation of contradiction in history identical with the divine life, I argue that although this is a real concern, Hegel’s account is more equivocal than normally admitted. Finally, I argue that the distinguishing feature between Przywara and Hegel is what happens after the moment of contradiction; that is where we see the most important difference between an analogical and a dialectical account of reason. (shrink)

This article concerns the nature of reason in the work of the Twentieth Century Catholic theologian Erich Przywara and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. The discussion centers on three interlocking issues: (a) The question whether proper thinking submits to or transgresses the principle of non-contradiction; (b) The relationship between reason and history; (c) The theological concern with distinguishing the “history of reason” and the divine life. It is argued that both Hegel and Przywara give an account of reason where there are (...) moments of contradiction, and that this is a necessary feature of historical existence. Further, while Przywara and others are concerned with Hegel’s making reason’s reconciliation of contradiction in history identical with the divine life, I argue that although this is a real concern, Hegel’s account is more equivocal than normally admitted. Finally, I argue that the distinguishing feature between Przywara and Hegel is what happens after the moment of contradiction; that is where we see the most important difference between an analogical and a dialectical account of reason. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPolitical rituals, like the sovereign acclamation described in Rousseau’s social contract, exhibit a logic of representation that seem to oscillate between presence and absence, and enact a problematic identification of the people as a multitude of individuals and as a whole. This article explores this logic of rituals by comparing problems of political representation in Rousseau and Agamben with the highest principle of Aristotle’s philosophy. It thus elucidates the problem of representation in rituals of political power.